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Marta Zając
Subject in Difference, or on (Feminine) 
Becomings: Deleuze and Guattari's 
and Cixous' Concept of Subjectivity*
Is it possible to develop a debate on subjectivity without the familiar no­
tions of the “mind,” “body,” “emotions” or “reason”? This is the case of 
A Thousand Plateaus. Deleuze and Guattari, in their extensive account of 
subjectivity, speak as if the pillars of human subjectivity did not exist at all; 
they allude only to the concept of the body, yet with a queer notion of the “Body 
without Organs,” which sounds like a blatant provocation (and is often mis­
takenly received so). To be precise, Deleuze and Guattari do not give an account 
of human subjectivity; they speak of “monsters and machines”; for them, the 
human subject should not be separated from the mineral, plant, animal or 
demonic realms. Their account of subjectivity proliferates with vampires, 
wolves and rats; they quite seriously pose the questions of becoming-veg­
etable, becoming-music or becoming-sleep; there is no mention of the tasks 
of thinkers or philosophers (whom Deleuze and Guattari are, after all) but 
instead we learn that “writing is traversed by strange becomings” and writ­
ers are “sorcerers.”
Yet a sense of artificial horror which accompanies Deleuze and Guattari’s 
theories (Great America of philosophy?) should not eclipse their theoretical 
significance. Bernardo Alexander Attias warns against taking literally the 
“rhetorical excesses” of Anti-Oedipus (the other extremely influential book 
Deleuze and Guattari wrote together) and makes it plain that these ought to 
* This article is reprinted after: M. Zając, The Feminine of Difference: Gilles Deleuze, 
Hélène Cixous and Contemporary Critique of the Marquis de Sade (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 
2002), pp. 91-109.
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be understood as “rhetorical strategies rather than theoretical elaborations.”1 
(After Aristotle, he defines rhetoric as “the art of persuasion.”* 2) Attias’ view 
about Anti-Oedipus applies even more to A Thousand Plateaus. A prominent 
theory Deleuze and Guattari try to persuade us of in A Thousand Plateaus is 
the theory of “becomings.”
The paradox of becomings - as a theory of subjectivity - consists in the 
fact that it promotes a view of the subject which apparently brings about its 
end. (Deleuze said in an interview: “Félix and I, and many others like us, don’t 
feel we are persons exactly.”3) Yet, when Deleuze remarks, “[y]ou have to take 
the work as a whole, to try and follow rather than judge it,”4 he suggests 
a practical (pragmatic) rather than purely theoretical (abstract) approach. “For 
Deleuze, real thinking is inseparable from acting”5 his critics insist. The task 
of this argument is to show the connections between the mechanism of becom­
ings and the “feminine” reality of the texts by Hélène Cixous. It is to feminists 
that the theory of becomings appears particularly disquieting and upsetting, 
when mistaken for an account of dispersed and polymorphous subjectivity. And 
it is also for feminists that the theory of becomings offers useful tools for the 
political improvement of the social scene.
Writing on “becomings” poses a few problems. First, one deals with ma­
terial which is, on an unprecendented scale, abstract, even obscure. This is partly 
due to the mentioned exclusion of many concepts that discourse on subjectiv­
ity commonly relies on. The notions of reason, mind, emotions, sensations, 
perceptions, etc., the aid-kit of psychology, are abstract but familiar, and thus 
facilitate the presentation of problems - even though they hardly affect the way 
we comprehend them. Deleuze is certainly right in saying that one has to accept 
the end of a given concept, the moment of its exhaustion, sterility, or impo- 
tency. Whatever the name, concepts die - they conceive nothing. Deleuze and 
Guattari’s enterprise is not a matter of replacing one set of concepts with another, 
and disguising the old content with brand-new wrapping paper, in shocking 
colour and design. Each of the theoretical concepts they work, tell their stories 
with, displays some complicated relation with the familiar. However, to expli­
' Bernardo Alexander Attias, “To Each Its Own Sexes. Toward a Rhetorical Understanding 
of Molecular Revolution,” in Deleuze and Guattari. New Mappings in Politics, Philosophy, 
and Culture, eds. Eleanor Kaufman and Kevin Jon Heller (Minneapolis, London: Minnesota 
University Press, 1998), p. 103.
2 Ibid., p. 96.
3 Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, 1972-1990, trans. Martin Joughin (New York, 1995 
[1994]), p. 141. Quoted after Ian Buchanan, “Introduction,” The South Atlantic Quarterly, 
special issue: A Deleuzian Century?, ed. Ian Buchman, Vol. 96, No. 3 (1997), p. 385.
4 Deleuze, Negotiations, p. 85. Quoted after Buchanan, “Introduction,” p. 387.
5 Aden Evans, Mani Haghighi, Stacey Johnson, Karen Ocana, and Gordon Thompson, 
“Another Always Thinks in Me,” in Deluze and Guattari..., p. 279.
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cate those relations is simply out of point. The primary task of this argument 
remains to suggest the conceptual, paradigmatic, affinity between Deleuze and 
Guattari’s and Cixous’ thought. One cannot argue, however, for the practical 
and political significance of becomings thus conceived before the very mech­
anism is introduced. The argument on becomings will be then preceded by 
a section meant to produce a mere outline of the theory.
Becomings
Whatever the level considered, becomings never follow natural connections. 
Deleuze and Guattari exclude from becomings mental processes of mediation, 
biological processes of evolution, and social relations of filiation.6 The rela­
tions of resemblance, imitation, and identification between concepts imply 
a certain pre-existent “natural” ground for their relatedness, which is then only 
recognised and realised. Similarly, evolution and filiation represent the most 
“natural” and “regular” modes of relating individuals. Becomings, in contrast, 
flout the demands of both regularity and naturalness. Becomings provoke an 
encounter between entities whose intimacy has no natural basis. They develop 
through “unnatural participations” and rely upon “contagion.”7 8They are like 
a contact with a vampire, bonds of intimacy established against nature, ties of 
blood that have nothing to do with family relations: “[t]he vampire does not 
filiate, it infects."*
Instead of a linear, thread-like, process of transition from one entity to 
another, becomings involve a moment of the encounter between heterogene­
ous, unrelated entities. Deleuze and Guattari name this encounter involution, 
which is a useful term as it combines two familiar concepts, “evolution” and 
“to involve.” Involvement is an extra effect, a product of interest or desire. 
Involution relates as evolution does, but on different grounds and on different 
terms. Involution draws two unrelated concepts together. Becoming is an event 
of the middle:
A line of becoming is not defined by points that it connects, or by points 
that compose it; on the contrary, it passes lietween points, it comes up through 
the middle [...] a line of becoming has neither beginning nor end, departure 
6 “A becoming is not a correspondence [...] neither is it a resemblance, an imitation, or 
[...] an identification [...] Finally, becoming is not an evolution, at least not an evolution by 
descent and filiation.” Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (London: The Athlone Press, 1992), pp. 237-238.
7 Ibid., p. 242.
8 Ibid., pp. 241-242.
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nor arrival, origin nor destination [...] A line of becoming has only a middle 
[...] A becoming is neither one nor two, nor the relation of the two; it is the 
in-between.9
Even though the activity of the middle endangers the integrity of the subject, 
becomings do not spell the end of subjectivity as such. Deleuze and Guattari 
insist upon the co-existence of two dimensions of the subject, the “molar” and 
“molecular” ones, which correspond to two planes of the real, the plane of 
immanence and the plane of transcendence, respectively. Becomings activate 
the molecular dimension. “All becomings are molecular,”10 *we read.
The plane of immanence is being in its raw, dynamic, and, in a sense, 
anarchic state:
[...] a pure plane of immanence, univocality, composition, upon which every­
thing is given, upon which unformed elements and materials dance that are 
distinguished from one another only by their speed and that enter into this 
or that individuated assemblage depending on their connections, their rela­
tions of movement. A fixed plane of life upon which everything stirs, slows 
down or accelerates [...] a plane of consistency peopled by anonymous mat­
ter, by infinite bits of impalpable matter entering into varying connections.11
It is the function of the plane of transcendence to provide the spontaneous, 
palpitating compositions of the plane of immanence with clear outlines. On the 
plane of transcendence, which breeds notions like form, figure, design, ground, 
end, project, etc.,12 being settles down into a concrete shape and state. The plane 
of transcendence is a plane of organisation, “a hidden principle [...] a plan(e) 
of organisation [...] of development [...] a teleological plan(e), a design, a mental 
principle.”13 Becomings are spontaneous and unpredictable. (”[T]he idea of 
mapping encounters on the plane of immanence rather than organising them 
according to a pre-given plan, surfaces most forcefully in Deleuze and Guat- 
tari’s conception of ‘becomings’,”14 Aurelia Armstrong remarks.) While the 
plane of transcendence is the foundation of the finite subject, on the plane of 
immanence the self is nothing but “a threshold,” a “door,” an interstice through 
which new identities slip, a stream of molecular compositions which undermine 
the solid ground of once assumed identity.
’Ibid., p. 293.
,u Ibid., p. 275.
" Ibid., p. 255.
12 Ibid., p. 254.
13 Ibid., p. 265.
14 Aurelia Armstrong, “Some Reflections on Deleuze’s Spinoza. Composition and 
Agency,” in Deleuze and Philosophy. The Difference Engineer, ed. Keith Ansell Pearson (Lon­
don: Routledge, 1997), p. 55.
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The distinction between the two planes breeds the distinction between two 
bodies: the physical body, which is a fact, and the so-called Body without 
Organs, which is a ’’practice”15 and a ’’program.”16 The organisation of the plane 
of transcendence manifests in the unity of the physical body, the organism, the 
organisation of organs. The Body without Organs - a ’’connection of desires, 
conjunction of flows, continuum of intensities.”17, “a Collectivity (assembling 
elements, things, plants, animals, tools, people, powers, and fragments of all 
of these,”18 is a ’’body of composition,” what we are on the plane of imma­
nence. In the Body without Organs, the organisation of organs and functions 
gives way to the composition of flows, intensities and desires. ’‘Deleuze’s [...] 
view of the body [...] is not at all biological,”19 Scott Lash rightly observes.
However, the molar and molecular distinction, upon which this two-dimen­
sional view of the subject relies, does not end in a series of familiar dichot­
omies: the centre opposed to the fringe, the essence opposed to the margin, 
or the inside opposed to the outside. The plane of organisation and the plane 
of composition do not stay in an either-or relation. This point, however, is often 
overlooked, and if so, it causes major problems. “[T]he two types of organ­
isation are always intermixed in any concrete manifestation,”20 John Mullar- 
key argues in response to common but mistaken readings of Deleuze as 
a prophet of dissolution. The two planes co-exist and interact. (”[M]olar clus­
ters affected by becomings,”21 Ian Hamilton Grant names the relation between 
the two planes.) The radical claims which Deleuze and Guattari make, like 
“[y]ou have the individuality of a day, a season [...] a climate, a wind, a fog,”22 
are signs of the emphasis they put upon the molecular, instead of molar, di­
mension of the subject, upon its permanent openness, responsiveness, recep­
tiveness, and kaleidoscopic design. Yet this stratum has to be completed with 
a general sense of unity (belonging), a contour of sanity drawn around the 
fluctuating and rebellious formative fringe of the subject.
The intricacies of the relation between the two planes of the real (the plane 
of composition and the plane of organisation), between their effects (individ­
uations and individuals), and between two bodies (a Body without Organs and 
15 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand.... p. 150.
16 Ibid., p. 151.
17 Ibid., p. 161.
18 Ibid.
19 Scott Lash. "Genealogy and the Body: Foucault/Deleuze/Nietzsche,” in The Body, 
Social Process and Cultural Theory, eds. Mike Featherstone, Mike Hepworth, and Bryan S. 
Turner (London: Sage Publications, 1991), p. 269.
20 John Mullarkey, “Deleuze and Materialism: One or Several Matters? in The South 
Atlantic Quarterly, p. 444.
21 Ian Hamilton Grant, “ ‘At the Mountains of Madness’. The Demonology of the New 
Earth and the Politics of Becoming,” in Deleuze and Philosophy .... pp. 109.
22 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand..., pp. 261-262.
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the body as an organism) can be clarified with the image of an island: the 
marriage of two elements: the earth and the water. After Carlos Castaneda and 
his Tales of Power, Deleuze and Guattari bring the Tonal, the island, to meet 
its Nagual, the sea that surrounds the island. The tonal stands for solid con­
cepts, for all that is “organised and organising [...] signifying or signified [...] 
susceptible to interpretation, explanation [...] the Self {Moi), the subject [...] 
God, the judgement of God.” In other words, tonal is everything; but, nagual, 
“[fjlows of intensity, their fluids, their fibers, their continuums and conjunctions 
of affects, the wind,”23 the sea that surrounds the island, is also everything. The 
island, unless it allows the waves and the wind to caress its coastline, will tower 
above the sea like a dead bone, a monument to its own hard-core and rock-tough 
existence. The crucial thing is that the island cannot be destroyed, submerged 
in the sea; Deleuze and Guattari insist after Castaneda, “[t]he tonal must be 
protected at any cost,”24 and add, “a nagual that erupts, that destroys the tonal, 
a body wihout organs that shatters all the strata, turns immediately into a body 
of nothingness, pure self-destruction whose only outcome is death.”25 The stra­
tum of organisation, of subjectivity, is necessary as a protection against death. 
The dictatorship of the plane of immanence spells death - reality precipates into 
chaos; the dictatorship of the plane of transcendence spells death as well - reality 
gets immobilised. The lack of balance between tonal and nagual is like mad 
Medusa and her petrified victim: death is at work on both sides.
Despite the impression Deleuze and Guattari’s expositions produce, the 
elements of the plane of immanence, the components of the Body without 
Organs, are not particles, molecules, or atoms, but degrees and intensities - 
the “individuations” of the plane of composition opposed to “individuals” of 
the plane of organisation. (Deleuze and Guattari use the name “haecceity” for 
the individuations of the plane of immanence.26) An “individuation” (a hae­
cceity) can be a simple quality, or an attribute like “a degree of heat,” or “an 
intensity of white.” Besides, individuations include shapeless, formless and 
insubstantial “beings” like the wind, fog, a climate, and sleep. Finally, a play 
of degrees and intensities (simple individuations) constantly builds up to new 
compositions (complex individuations) that intersect the boundaries of finite 
forms, and whose ever-changing nature never gets fixed by naming procedures: 
23 Ibid., p. 162.
24 Carlos Castaneda, Tales of Power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974), p. 125. 
Quoted after Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand..., p. 161.
25 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand .... p. 162.
26 Ibid., p. 263. The concept of haecceity, derived from the Latin haec, was introduced 
to the history of philosophy by Duns Scotus, which Deleuze and Guattari admit, yet they 
find Scotus’ elaboration on the relation between haecceity and haec inadequate: “it is a fruitful 
error because it suggests a mode of individuation that is distinct from that of a thing or 
a subject.” See Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand..., p. 540, n. 33.
Subject in Difference, or on (Feminine) Becomings... 173
There is a mode of individuation very different from that of a person, subject, 
thing, or substance. We reserve the name haecceity for it. A season, a winter, 
a summer, an hour, a date [...] are haecceities in the sense that they consist en­
tirely of relations of movement and rest between molecules or particles.27
A degree of heat is a perfectly individuated warmth distinct from the sub­
stance or the subject that receives it. A degree of heat can enter into compo­
sition with a degree of whiteness, or with another degree of heat, to form 
a third unique individuality distinct from that of the subject [...] A degree, 
an intensity, is an individual, a Haecceity that enters into composition with 
other degrees, other intensities, to form another individual.28
[...] between substantial forms and determined subjects, between the two, there 
is not only a whole operation of demonic local transports, but a natural play 
of haecceities, degrees, intensities, events and accidents that compose 
individuations totally different from those of the well-formed subjects that 
receive them.29
Individuations (haecceities) envelop the stratum of finite beings to form their 
luminous halo, an insubstantial margin. Haecceities (as modes of individua­
tion) form at the boundaries of the determined subject (as a modality of an 
individual), a no man’s land, a frontier-zone open to all kinds of illegal vis­
itations. (Zygmunt Bauman presents a parallel image of the porous and con­
tradiction-ridden boundaries of the postmodern body, the body of the “pleas­
ure-collector”; the image which is useful as far as it enhances the impervious 
nature of the body, yet incomplete in its view of merely sensual surface ac­
cidents, and not distinct enough in the differentiation which should be main­
tained between the two planes.30)
One may ask why and how to distinguish between haecceities and becom­
ings; they both operate on the plane of immanence and both are events of the 
middle (”[a] haecceity has neither beginning nor end, origin nor destination; 
it is always in the middle”31). Haecceities are only the material of becomings; 
2' Ibid., p. 261.
28 Ibid., p. 253.
29 Ibid.
30 “Most sensations that the pleasure-collector’s body may experience need stimuli com­
ing from the outside world; the consumerist condition makes it imperative that the body opens 
up as widely as possible to the potential of rich and ever richer experiences contained in 
such stimuli [...] Yet the same exchange with the outside world comprises the individual’s 
control over bodily fitness [...] which in turn is the condition of the body’s capacity for gath­
ering sensations. That capacity may be diminished if immigration control is not vigilant 
enough; admission must be selective at all times - but would not all selectivity impoverish 
the pool of potential sensations?” Zygmunt Bauman, Life in Fragments. Essays in Postmodern 
Morality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 120.
31 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand ..., p. 263.
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haecceities are natural; becomings are a sudden event, an accident. Haeccei- 
ties (complex individuations) come about due to a natural play of degrees and 
intensities (simple individuations) while the driving force of becomings is desire. 
(A trivial analogy: flirting and having sex, foreplay and its culmination.)
What is the desire which is the substance and motivation of becomings? 
“[UJnderstanding the BwO requires a willingness to understand desire independ­
ently of human, instrumental agency,”32 John S. Howard comments on the desire 
inherent in becomings, and thus points to the plane of immanence as its 
a-personal origin. Following Deleuze and Guattari, one should see the driving 
force of becomings as the desire for molecular proximity, the desire to become 
the closest in terms of a molecular organisation to what one is becoming. An 
individual, a molar man or woman, enter into a relation with another individ­
ual, or with a certain individuation, to bring about a certain molecular compo­
sition: a molecular woman, plant, animal, mineral, etc:
Starting from the forms one has, the subject one is, the organs one has, or 
the functions one fulfills, becoming is to extract particles between which one 
establishes the relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness that are 
closest to what one is becoming, and through which one becomes. This is 
the sense in which becoming is the process of desire.33
Do not imitate the dog, but make your organism enter into composition with 
something else in such a way that the particles emitted from the aggregate 
thus composed will be canine as a function of the relations of movement and 
rest.34
Albertine can always imitate a flower, but it is when she is sleeping and en­
ters into composition with the particles of sleep that her beauty spot and the 
texture of her skin enter a relation of rest and movement that place her in 
the zone of a molecular vegetable: the becoming-plant of Albertine.35
Descriptions proliferate, but the key term of becomings - the “molecular 
composition,” remains a cryptic phrase - which does not facilitate the under­
standing of Deleuze and Guattari’s theory. Even when the two types of the 
subject are brought together only to clarify their individual features, the 
molecular one, as a rule, remains hidden behind notions equally vague and 
indeterminate:
molar entity is, for example, the woman as defined by her form, endowed 
with organs and functions and assigned as a subject. Becoming-woman is not 
32 John S. Howard, “Subjectivity and Space. Deleuze and Guattari’s BwO in the New
World Order,” in Deleuze and Guattari..., p. 121.
33 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand .... p. 272.
34 Ibid., p. 274.
33 Ibid., p. 275.
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imitating this entity or even transforming oneself into it [...] not imitating or 
assuming the female form, but emitting particles that enter the relation of 
movement and rest, or the zone of proximity, of a microfemininity, in other 
words, that produce in us a molecular woman.36
[...] all becomings are molecular; the animal, flower, or stone one becomes 
are molecular collectivities [...] not molar subjects, objects, or form that we 
know from the outside and recognize from experience, through science, or 
by habit.37
How to recognise a molecular plant, child, woman, animal, how to know one 
becomes specifically towards, say, a molecular crab or vegetable? One never 
will, because what is real is becoming, while what one becomes may not be 
real at all: “[bjecoming produces nothing other than itself [...] What is real is 
the becoming itself, the block of becoming, not the supposedly fixed terms 
through which that which becomes passes [...] The becoming-animal of the 
human being is real, even if the animal the human being becomes is not.”38 
The reason for some of the blank spaces in the theory of becomings may be 
the unmediated nature of becomings. (”[B]ecomings represent the discovery, 
through action, of ideas of composition of relations.”39 Armstrong suggests that 
only the practice of becomings will create the theory of becomings.) Becom­
ings are an event of the middle, which is the space of immediacy. The begin­
ning and end (origin and destination, past and future) anticipate mediation: 
create a certain space for progression, or a certain story to narrate. Only the 
middle is. Because of their unmediated “essence,” which is the middle, becom­
ings have to be, to some extent, intuitive.
What is clear is that the becoming subject is in the difference between the 
familiar and unfamiliar. At the same time, it puts to doubt the idea of being 
familiar with oneself, since in becoming, the subject recklessly and restlessly 
abandons its borders, and gets exposed to the alien. The becoming subject is 
infinite, yet not deprived of its middle. Yet, the middle (the former centre, or 
the focal point) is dislocated onto the “fringes.” In other words, the becoming 
subject is not in the centre o/both its inside and outside (which would encom­
pass it like two concentric envelopes) but in the difference between the inside: 
the inward, conservative, centralising orientation, and the outside: the outward, 








Armstrong, “Some Reflections ...” p. 56. [Emphasis mine.]
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The "Feminine" of Becomings
On reading Deleuze and Guattari’s claim that “writing is traversed by strange 
becomings,”40 one confronts the problem whether the writing they mention 
includes l’écriture féminine, whether the feminine subject, the subject of 
l’écriture féminine, can be read as the becoming subject. “[M]y self is only 
one of the elements of the immense mass of material [...] we are dust [...] we 
are atoms,”41 Cixous confesses. To prepare the ground for the view of the fem­
inine subject as becoming requires a presentation of its borders as oriented 
towards the middle: the pivot of becomings.
The state of the borders of the feminine subject is qualified through the 
peculiar condition of “a nonclosure that is not submission,”42 which suggests 
rather an ambiguous disposition to encounter, but not to let in, the state of 
balancing between trust and caution. (Needless to say, it is the in-between where 
the two are compromised.) The non-submission of the feminine subject has no 
militant undertones: “she comes out of herself [...] not to do away with the space 
between, but to see it, to experience what she is not, what she is, what she can 
be.”43 Yet the nonclosure of the feminine borders (’’never settling down, pouring 
out, going everywhere”44) does not spell her fall into formlessness, either. What 
protects woman equally from destructive aggression and submission is the 
genuine passion she develops for her Other: “she comes out of herself to go 
to the other”45 ; “[subjectivity vacillates, between no one and all of its pos­
sible individualities”46 ; “[wjriting is the passageway, the entrance, the exit, the 
dwelling place of the other in me”47 ; “her writing [...] can only go on and on 
[...] daring these dizzying passages in other, fleeting and passionate dwellings 
within him, within the hims and hers whom she inhabits just long enough to 
watch them [...] to love them”48; “a wonderful ‘sun of energy’ - love, - that 
bombards and disintegrates [...] ephemereal, amorous anomalies so that they 
40 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand..., p. 240.
41 Hélène Cixous, “Extreme Fidelity,” excerpted from “Extreme Fidelity,” trans. Ann 
Liddle and Susan Sellers, in Writing Differences: Readings from the Seminar of Hélène Cixous 
(Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1988), rpt. in The Hélène Cixous Reader, ed. Susan 
Sellers (London, New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 136.
42 Cixous, “Sorties: Out and Out: Attacks/Ways Out/Forays,” trans. Betsy Wing, in The 
Newly Born Woman (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1996), p. 86.
42 Ibid., p. 86.
44 Ibid., p. 87.
45 Ibid., p. 86.
46 Cixous, “First Names of No One,” trans. Deborah Cowell, excerpted from Prénoms 
de personne (Paris: Seuil, 1974), in The Hélène Cixous Reader, p. 28.
47 Cixous, “Sorties,” pp. 85-86.
48 Ibid., p. 88.
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can be recomposed in other bodies for new passions.”49 It is commonly agreed 
that the model of subjectivity Cixous advances is “based on openness to the 
Other.”50 But when one inspects the way the encounters between the feminine 
subject and the Other are presented, this claim can be pushed further: the 
feminine subject is the becoming subject.
Woman’s Other, her exotic intimate, spans the human and non-human 
realms. Woman meets, and strikes up intimacy with “males, gentlemen, mon­
archs, princes, orphans, flowers, mothers, breasts,”51 or “women [...] monsters 
[...] jackals [...] Arabs [...] aliases,”52 or “animals of joy [...] artists [...] rea­
soning beings [...] animals of prey [...] aggressive souls,”53 which echoes the 
Deleuzian “unnatural participations.” What is more, woman’s Other, when 
specified, often comes in numbers. Deleuze and Guattari profess, “[w]e do not 
become animal without a fascination for the pack, for multiplicity.”54 It is 
a ’’fascination for multiplicity” which shows through in the clusters, packs, 
hordes and bouquets of woman’s exotic lovers. The proliferation of the exotic 
lovers the feminine subject splits into is like the proliferation of the molecular 
compositions towards which becomings lead.
An illustration of the becoming of the feminine subject is the peculiar 
relation developed between woman and the orange - as critics admit, a powerful 
symbol in Cixous’ writings.55 It would be hard to speculate why. The flaming 
colour and the juicy pulp form a distinct aura of the orange fruit. Is the orange 
a symbol of life impetus and energy that lights up the gloom the Apple brought? 
Likely, but one has to remember that becomings are not a metaphor; the plane 
of immediacy upon which becomings thrive is “[a] fixed plane of life.”56 (’’The 
plane of consistency is the abolition of all metaphor - all that consists is real.”57) 
Becoming-orange should not be taken as a metaphor, either; becoming-orange 
is an event, not a metaphor. “Cixous wants to explore the inside, the under­
neath, the taste and the texture,”58 Shiach remarks. The significance of the 
49 Ibid., p. 84.
50 Morag Shiach, Hélène Cixous. A Politics of Writing (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 23.
51 Cixous, “Sorties,” p. 84.
52 Ibid., p. 84.
53 Cixous, “La - The (Feminine),” trans. Susan Sellers, excerpted from La (Paris: des 
femmes, 1979), in The Hélène Cixous Reader, p. 60.
54 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand..., pp. 239-240.
55 Cf “(A]n example of object that in its materiality and its seeming triviality is often left 
out of novelistic representations; the unconscious, the East; the Jewish people, or women 
[...] the focus for a complex set of imagery involving blood, light, and moistness.” Shiach, 
Hélène Cixous ..., p. 63.
56 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand .... p. 255.
57 Ibid., p. 69. Quoted after Robin Mackay, “Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Wildstyle in 
Full Effect,” in Deleuze and Philosophy ..., p. 253.
58 Shiach, Hélène Cixous ..., p. 36.
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orange’s presence for this enterprise becomes clear in a scene from “(With) Or 
the Art of Innocence,” one which evolves around the intimacy between wom­
an (her skin and eye) and “orange flower water.”
To enhance the intensity of life, woman sprinkles herself with orange flower 
water; at the same time, Arabic hieroglyphs, in which the name of the perfumes 
is written on the phial, capture her attention:
I need writing; I need to surprise myself living: I need to feel myself quiver 
with living: I need to call myself into living [...] I need to accompany living 
with music: I need writing to celebrate living: this morning I perfumed my­
self with essence of orange flower water: on the phial of essential oil there 
is the original label covered with Arabic signs that spirit me away on their 
sweeping curls to an unknown but imaginable neighborhood in Baghdad.59
To “celebrate living” woman responds to a variety of immediate impressions: 
a mist of sprayed orange flower water and the extravagant, eye-catching letter­
images. The mist of orange flower water, the invisible particles of the perfume, 
linger on and penetrate her skin, circulate gently across its surface. Letters of 
an unknown language form a cryptic code. The eye, suspended in their pres­
ence, can neither possess nor destroy the enigmatic script; their communica­
tion is never consummated. One may leave the secret word or keep gazing at 
its forever immaculate shape. The orange’s essence creates a feast of imme­
diacy. The orange’s essence (’’essence of orange flower water”) recovers the 
essence of life.
The presence of the orange permeates the whole of the feminine reality. The 
orange appears to be its dislocated centre: the orange displays all the features 
of the divine centre, but at the same time it animates the fringes, enlivens the 
middle. The orange has to be essential: it is the crisis of writing that follows 
woman’s separation from the orange: “[m]ute I fled the orange.”60 And it is 
only the orange re-gained that resuscitates writing: “[s]he put the orange back 
into the deserted hands of my writing.”61 The orange is everywhere, floods 
bodies and words. “[I]t was nearly the nymph of the orange that awakened in 
my breast and surged forth streaming from the heart’s basin”62 ; “[t]he influx 
of orange propagated itself to the ends of my bodies”63 ; “I was alive in the 
59 Cixous, “(With) Or The Art of Innocence,” trans. Stephanie Flood, excerpted from (With) 
Ou l’art de l'innocence (Paris: des femmes, 1981), in The Helene Cixous Reader, p. 95.
60 Cixous, “To Live the Orange,” excerpted from Vivre l’orange/To Live the Orange, trans. 
Sarah Cornell and Ann Lindle (Paris: des femmes, 1979), rpt. in The Hélène Cixous Reader, 
p. 86.
61 Ibid., p. 86.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., p. 87.
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moment, I had orange all over [...] I was humid, my skin young, sweet.”64 
Woman rejoices in the juices streaming all over her body. But the intimacy with 
the orange enlivens the mind as well, and produces “the juice-filled fruits of 
meditation.”65 The orange inspires the mind and penetrates the body, spans and 
fulfills all needs and desires.
No wonder the orange is proclaimed woman’s god and paradise and a stamp 
of goodness: “[t]he orange is a beginning. Starting out from the orange all 
voyages are possible. All voices that go their way via her are good”66; “[i]t 
was an orange regained.”67 However, one can notice a certain dissonance here: 
the orange is only the beginning. It does not establish the complete route, and 
thus flees the organisation of the plane of transcendence. The orange is the 
divinity of the plane of immanence, where all journeys are suspended in in­
détermination, and find their culmination in the middle. After all, the orange 
is the quintessence of immediacy and an emblem of relatedness, both of which 
are attributes of the plane of composition rather than organisation. (”[O]range’s 
existence [...] all that is kin of the air and the earth, including all of the sense 
relations that every orange keeps alive and circulates, with life, death, women, 
forms, volumes, movement, matter [...] the invisible links between fruits and 
bodies, the destiny of perfumes.”68)
It is difficult to be decisive about the idea of becomings, which, really, is 
less a theory than an art of persuasion. But the persistence with which the orange 
permeates woman’s reality loses its purely poetic air when related to the the­
ory of becomings. The woman is driven to molecular proximity with the orange. 
Even though the orange hardly materialises in the feminine reality (its pres­
ence manifests in “the invisible links between fruits and bodies”), it floats as 
a sign of relatedness: the orange induces the desire for a union, creates dreams 
of mutual inter-penetration. One can be persuaded about the view of woman 
as the becoming subject, and femininity as becoming in yet another manner: 
when “voice,” an attribute of the feminine subject, is also inscribed into the 
mechanism of becomings.
Deleuze and Guattari insist upon “musical expression” as a component of 
becomings.69 It is possible to develop the understanding of “becoming-music” 
with the references Deleuze and Guattari themselves make to lullabies, sym­
phonies, operas and songs, or their allusions to music transposed from the molar 
level onto the molecular one.70 But the “music of becomings” may also be 
64 Ibid., p. 88.
65 Ibid., p. 87.
66 Ibid., p. 88.
67 Ibid., p. 87.
68 Ibid.
69 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand..., pp. 299-309.
™ Ibid., p. 309.
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construed as the resonance which accompanies the encounter of the heteroge­
neous series, a phenomenon Deleuze discusses in The Logic of Sense.
Resonance is the sign of the complication of disparate notions: “[bjetween 
these basic [heterogeneous - M.Z.] series, a sort of internal resonance is pro­
duced [...] it is necessary for the heterogeneous series to be really internalised 
in the system, comprised or complicated ... [tjheir differences must be inclu­
sive.”11 Becomings, the “unnatural participations,” also involve a complication 
of heterogeneous series, and thus form a ’’resonating” event. Resonance is the 
sign of the sudden communication of entities whose proximity cannot be taken 
for granted. In this sense, resonance is also a sound of the flickering triumphs 
of the plane of immanence. Resonance is the “voice” of the Body without 
Organs, the only way the Body without Organs can be heard. The Body without 
Organs, accompanied by the sound of resonating disparates, is for ever the 
“sonorous” body.
Like the Deleuzian plane of immanence, the animate matter of the feminine 
reality resounds with inner vibrations: “[t]here is a time for listening to the vibra­
tions that things produce in detaching themselves from the nothing-being.”71 2 The 
inner vibrations of things deliver them from nothingness. The respectful listen­
ing to things as they are bom is contrasted with “murderous speech.” Murderous 
words fix the identity of things, “fall upon things and fix their quaverings and 
make them discordant and deafen them.”73 The quaverings of things are their 
fragile but potent songs, vibrations resonating like hymns counteracting death. 
Cixous’ poetic interludes contain non-poetic, literal, warning: you listen to and 
respect the song of life (the inner vibrations of matter), or suppress it.
Cixous reflects on the practice of l’écriture féminine, “I write a more sub­
tle body than my busy body, the tympon body, I write - I think - ears that 
are more refined than my ears, that only hear what makes noise, but do not 
hear what moves, works, speaks, exists incessantly without being noticed.”74 
What transpires is that the feminine subject contributes to the production of 
a new body, apparently inconspicuous, invisible, yet desired as the only tool 
for the tasks for which the body as organism proves inadequate. The other body 
woman shapes is left unnamed, and specified only by its difference from the 
body as an organism.
The Body without Organs is the sonorous, resonating, body. For Cixous, 
voice is the essence of femininity, femininity is the essence of voice : “I can 
71 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale, ed. Constantin 
V. Boundas (London: The Athlone Press, 1990), p. 261.
72 Cixous, “To Live the Orange,” p. 89. This idea often is interpreted as Cixous’ debt 
to Heidegger. See Shiach, Hélène Cixous ..., p. 60, and Sellers, The Hélène Cixous Reader, 
p. 83.
73 Cixous, “To Live the Orange,” p. 89.
74 Cixous, “(With) Or The Art of Innocence,” p. 98.
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adore a voice: I am a woman: the love of the voice.”75 It is not accidental. 
Woman cannot be separated from voice; voice is her flesh and soul. The 
“feminine” body, the body woman writes, is the body she gives voice to. “Write 
yourself: your body must make itself heard”76; “[sjings the most carnal of my 
flesh [...] we hear ourselves internally to our nerves’ end.”77; “I am spacious 
singing Flesh”78 - this is repeated in Cixous’ texts like an incantation. Also, 
music is an indispensable component of l’écriture feminine: “[f]irst I sense 
femininity in writing by: a privilege of voice: writing and voice are entwined 
and interwoven [...] In feminine speech, as in writing, there never stops rever­
berating [...] song, the first music of the voice of love, which every woman 
keeps alive.”79 Music, writing and body are the inviolable composition of fem­
inine experience. The proposed idea of the feminine subject as the becoming 
subject can be completed with the view of the feminine “voice” being parallel 
to the “resonance” of the Deleuzian plane of immanence. The feminine writ­
ing resounds with the sudden complications of the plane of immanence: with 
the connections which compose the Body without Organs.
This intuition about the feminine subject as the resonating Body without 
Organs is enhanced with the climactic, in a sense, experience outlined in a scene 
from “To Live the Orange.” It is the climax of one’s experience on the plane 
of immanence - when structures burst open, when surfaces are not the guard­
ians of the inside but unfold to strike a harmony and resound with the trium­
phant songs of life at its unmediated purest. It is the triumph of the feminine, 
which flees the masculine law and organisation of the plane of transcendence, 
and traverses the plane whose components constantly converse and commu­
nicate, where concepts cannot be immobilised and opposed:
down in the depths of the self, the confinement of the being ceases [...] things 
remain free, all are equal in vitality [...] each being evolves according to its 
own necessity, following the order of its intimate elements [...] they bathe, 
in the middle of the world [...] Senses flow, circulate, messages as divinely 
complicated as the strange microphonetic signals, conveyed to the ears from 
the blood, tumults, calls, inaudible answers vibrate, mysterious connections 
are established. It is not impossible in the unrestrained conversing that among 
75 Cixous, “To Live the Orange,” p. 84. Sellers writes that for Cixous, “voice” is linked 
to the pre-symbolic stage, to the union between mother and child [Sellers, The Hélène Cixous 
Reader, p. 49]. Shiach, similarly, points to the proximity of voice to the unconscious, and to 
the way the feminine “song” transgresses the law of separation [Shiach, Hélène Cixous..., p. 22].
76 Cixous, “Sorties,” p. 97.
77 Cixous, “Breaths,” trans. Susan Sellers, excerpted from Souffles (Paris: des femmes, 
1975), in The Hélène Cixous Reader, p. 50.
78 Cixous, “Sorties,” p. 88.
79 Ibid., pp. 92-93.
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disjunct, remote, disproportionate ensembles, at moments, harmonies of in­
calculable resonance occur.80
This argument pronounces that the feminine voice is the resonating sign 
of becomings, the concomitant of the compositions struck on the plane of 
immanence. The body woman writes is the Body without Organs: vibrations 
which animate the inanimate, and shake the ground of fixed identities.
Neither Deleuze and Guattari nor Cixous devote much attention to the 
clarity of the ideas they propose. They produce hermetic, even hallucinatory 
discourse, where thought may wonder (and wander) not to find any anchor­
ing point. But one can see a few surprisingly clear points Deleuze and Guattari 
make with which they affect our comprehension of subjectivity. First, as was 
said, they dispense with all the pillars of discourse on subjectivity, yet keep 
the body. Still the concept of the body is maintained in a queer, self-contra­
dictory notion of the Body without Organs. It is yet another strategy of 
Deleuze (and Guattari) to “unground the ground.” The body is vital, and thus 
the ground of our existence. With the concept of the Body without Organs, 
the ground - the body of flows, intensities, desires, but above all, the body 
of pure difference, the body of the communicating middle - is maintained 
but ungrounded. Deleuze and Guattari produce a positive view of disintegra­
tion. They dismember the body, and remove its organs to celebrate differ­
ence; to point out that difference, and only difference, is vital; to abandon 
the petty fear of a sick organ. The middle, the communicating inside of the 
philosophy of difference, becomes central; the former centre, the plane of 
transcendence, is drawn to the margins.
Mullarkey argues for the partnership of the two planes: “[ajnother misun­
derstanding [...] tempts many to interpret Deleuze’s analyses as reductionist, 
to wit, that there is an ontological hierarchy between molarity and molecular­
ity, with the molar thereby unreal and everything genuinely molecular.”81 But 
is the perfect balance possible? What becomes relevant again is the image of 
the horizon-line, and the relation between the inside and the outside it estab­
lishes. The horizon-line, while it cannot be erased, safeguards organisation, and 
thus marks, in a fragile but distinct manner, the presence of the plane of tran­
scendence. But it is the plane of immanence that gains prominence as the more 
intimate, home-like dimension. We live in the permanent inside of the plane 
of immanence with nothing but the horizon-line to shape our experience of 
transcendence. The plane of transcendence is the moving end of our pespec- 
80 Cixous, “To Live the Orange,” pp. 91-92.
81 Mullarkey, “Deleuze and Materialism ...” p. 444.
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tive, the horizon of man’s immediate experience of life, and the only barrier 
against a fall into nothingness, the void of dissolution. (As Deleuze and Guat- 
tari insist, the Body without Organs, “full of gaiety, ecstasy, and dance,” when 
the impetus for destruction is stronger than the desire for composition, easily 
turns into the “emptied body,” the body of death.82)
Yet the plane of immanence, our Body without Organs is not given, and 
it cannot be taken for granted. “Find your body without organs. Find out how 
to make it. It’s a question of life and death [...] sadness and joy. It is where 
everything is played out.”83 With Deleuze and Guattari’s monotonous incite­
ments, the Body without Organs grows in significance. This is the revolution 
of Deleuze and Guattari’s model of subjectivity. The standard call is to over­
come the state of flux rather than to arrive at it. (The very idea of arriving at 
a state of flux sounds paradoxical.) The point of caution and worry is the sun 
rising rather than the waters into which it sinks. (’’Save the sun, everybody, 
from the watery deeps, the dark underneath it must go.”) But the Body with­
out Organs has nothing to do with “mere subsistence,” or “pure immanence,” 
with what is given, and thus held in contempt. It is a task, a challenge. And 
the guidelines are not given.
The Politics of Becomings
“Becomings [...] involve us in the political task of becoming other,”84 says 
Armstrong, creating the political context for becomings. Following the objec­
tives of this argument, the question about the political significance of becom­
ings will be related directly to the feminist debate. However, Mullarkey right­
ly observes that “the misimpression that Deleuze would dissolve molar beings 
into anonymous molecular flows has brought him much criticism from at least 
one quarter, namely, feminist philosophy.”85 It is sheer hysteria that sounds, for 
instance, in Alice Jardine’s commentary upon the concept of “becoming­
woman”:
to the extent that woman must “become woman” first [...] might that not mean 
that she must also be the first to disappear? Is it not possible that the process 
of “becoming woman” is but a new variation of an old allegory for the proc­
ess of women becoming obsolete? There would remain only her simulacrum: 
82 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand p. 150.
83 Ibid., p. 151.
84 Armstrong, “Some Reflections ...,” p. 56.
85 Mullarkey, “Deleuze and Materialism ...” p. 445.
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a female figure caught in a whirling sea of male configurations. A silent, mu­
table, head-less, desireless spatial surface necessary only for his metamor­
phosis?86
Jardine, like other feminist critics overwhelmed by the catastrophic implica­
tions of the BwO, refuses to consider the whole of Deleuze and Guattari’s theory. 
The theory of becomings is one of the most frequently referred to and the least 
understood parts of their philosophy. More objections are raised and more fears 
voiced; none of them, however, seem to be grounded in more than a mere 
haunting outline of Deleuze and Guattari’s theory.
Admittedly, Deleuze and Guattari make it plain that “there are many be­
comings of man, but no becoming-man,”87 and insist that “the woman as a molar 
entity has to become-woman in order that the man also becomes- or can become- 
woman.”88 It is also true that “all becomings begin with and pass through 
becoming-woman.”89 In the system of becomings woman seems to occupy 
a position both peculiar and disadvantegous. Woman’s privileged status in the 
order of becomings enhances only the idea of her subjection to man, who needs 
the mechanism of becomings for his own fulfillment. Still, Deleuze and Guattari 
explain that the lack of balance between man’s and woman’s position in be­
comings reflects the existent social order: “man is majoritarian par excellence, 
whereas becomings are minoritarian [...] It is perhaps the special situation of 
women in relation to the man-standard that accounts for the fact that becom­
ings, being minoritarian, always pass through a becoming-woman.”90 The ex­
clusion of man from the order of becomings is a consequence of his privileged, 
centred, domineering social and cultural status - of which Deleuze and Guat­
tari do not approve but at the same time cannot play unaware. Deleuze and 
Guattari’s theory, uniquely abstract, and apparently ignorant of practical issues, 
recognises, addresses, and develops as a reaction to, the same social context 
that has provoked the rise of feminism.
Deleuze and Guattari insist upon the molar and molecular dimension of 
subjectivity, but claim the strength of the latter and the urgent need to transform 
the former. The emphasis they put upon the molecular mode of subjectivity 
follows their strong conviction that the molar organisation can be unhinged (and 
improved) only on condition that the molecular dimension is activated (”The BwO 
defies the either-or logic that always leads to win-or-lose mentality,”91 Howard 
86 Alice Jardine, Gynesis: Configurations of Woman and Modernity (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1985), p. 217. Quoted after Grosz, Volatile ..., p. 161.
87 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand ..., p. 291.
88 Ibid., pp. 275-276.
89 Ibid., p. 277.
90 Ibid., p. 291.
91 Howard, “Subjectivity...,” p. 121.
Subject in Difference, or on (Feminine) Becomings... 185
says, pointing to the potential the Body without Organs carries for political 
change.) And, as they warn against the neglect of the matter, it is the ampu­
tation of the molecular that will spell the molar immobilised:
It is, of course, indispensable for women to conduct a molar politics, with 
a view of winning back their own organism, their own history, their own sub­
jectivity: “we as women ...” makes its appearance as a subject of enuncia­
tion. But it is dangerous to confine oneself to such a subject, which does not 
function without drying up a spring or stopping a flow. The song of life is 
often intoned by the driest of women, moved by ressentiment, the will to 
power and cold mothering [...] It is necessary to conceive of a molecular wom­
en’s politics that slips into molar confrontations and passes under or through 
them [...] The question is not, or not only, that of the organism, history and 
subject of enunciation that oppose masculine to feminine in the great dual­
ism machines. The question is fundamentally that of the body - the body 
they steal fr om us in order to fabricate opposable organisms.92
One reason to quote this passage at length is that it recalls a number of Cix- 
ous’ most renowned claims. Some of the expressions sound like allusions to, 
if not direct quotations of Cixous’ widely spread ideas of “women winning back 
their bodies,”93 or of the necessity to give woman back her “goods, her pleas­
ures, her organs, her vast bodily territories kept under seal.”94 The other, less 
disputable, reason is the clarity with which Deleuze and Guattari point to the 
significance of the “molecular politics.” And the two reasons combine, in fact, 
in the body Cixous writes on, the body stolen, both from men and women, and 
the Deleuzian Body without Organs, the becoming/emzm'ne subject, what/who 
we are on the plane of immanence.
’’Man” and “woman” are, in a sense, excluded from the plane of immanence. 
Man and woman, the male and female subject, have sexed bodies and gendered 
minds. They wholeheartedly support the molar organisation, and try desper­
ately to immobilise the horizon-line, or to raise its artificial substitutes at which 
they could clutch in a gesture of defence against the fluctuating ground of their 
home, the plane of immanence, the molecular organisation of being. Even 
though Deleuze and Guattari are not directly committed to feminism, their 
theory, founded upon a similar understanding of the cultural and social scene, 
is a way out of more than one cultural trap and blind alley feminists resist and 
fight.
In Negotiations, Deleuze asks, “[s]o how can we manage to speak without 
giving orders, without claiming to represent something or someone, how can 
92 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand p. 276.
93 Cixous, “Sorties,” p. 94.
94 Ibid., p. 97.
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we get people without the right to speak, to speak?”95 And as Buchanan ac­
curately paraphrases Deleuze’s words, “[t]he real philosophical problem [...] 
is not the determination of who can or should speak (a matter best left to the 
police) [...] but rather the fabrication of a set of conditions that would enable 
everyone to speak.”96 Deleuze’s and Guattari’s theories appear as a possibility 
of voice', to liberate the voice of many, and silence none.
95 Deleuze, Negotiations, p. 41. Quoted after Buchanan, “Introduction,” The South At­
lantic Quarterly, p. 385.
96 Ibid., p. 24. Quoted after Buchanan, “Introduction,” The South Atlantic Quarterly, p. 
385.
